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This paper re-examines Japan’s experience of the quantitative easing policy in 
light of the policy responses against the current financial and economic crisis.  
Central banks use various unconventional measures in the range of financial 
assets being purchased and in the scale of such purchases.  As the scope of 
such unconventional measures expands, it is often emphasized that the U.S. 
Federal Reserve policy reactions focus more on the asset side of its balance 
sheet, the so-called credit easing.    By contrast, the Bank of Japan’s quantitative 
easing policy from 2001 to 2006 set a target for the current account balances, the 
liability side of its balance sheet.  It is crucial to understand that central banks 
combine the two elements of their balance sheets, size and composition, to 
enhance the overall effects of unconventional policy measures, given constraints 
on policy implementation. 
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reflect those of the Bank of Japan. I. Introduction 
This paper re-examines Japan’s experience of the quantitative easing policy (QEP) in 
light of policy responses to the current financial and economic crisis in the major 
economies. 1   This paper thereby attempts to provide a roadmap for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the unconventional monetary policy. 
Confronted with the current financial and economic crisis, central banks have 
moved swiftly and aggressively to counter the adverse effects of the malfunctioning 
financial system.  In that process, central banks have implemented policy measures 
mainly in three main areas: reducing the policy interest rate, securing the stability of 
financial markets, and facilitating corporate financing.  In the second and third areas, 
central banks in the major economies have introduced various unconventional measures 
in the range of financial assets being purchased and in the scale of such purchases 
(Table 1).2    As a result, central banks in major economies have expanded their balance 
sheets significantly, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
(Figure 1). 
The U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) has dramatically expanded its balance sheet 
through  “credit easing” measures designed to intervene aggressively in the credit 
products market and related markets.  The Bank of England (BOE) has established a 
program for outright purchase of gilts and corporate bonds (CBs) to boost the supply of 
money and to improve the functioning of corporate credit markets.3  The European 
Central Bank (ECB) has extended its regular refinancing operations to “fixed-rate full-
allotment” liquidity provisions with a longer maturity up to 12 months.  It has also 
introduced a purchasing program for covered bonds.4  The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has 
                                                 
1  For the lessons from Japan’s experience since the burst of the bubble in the early 1990s, see also a 
series of speeches by Shirakawa (2009a, c, e). 
2  As private financial intermediation restores its normal function, some of the unconventional 
measures are currently scheduled to be terminated in due course.    For example, the Fed announced that it 
would complete its purchases of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities by the end of the 
first quarter of 2010. 
3  The BOE uses the term of “quantitative easing” to describe its unconventional policy measures.  
For the outline of its policy framework, see the BOE’s pamphlet, entitled Quantitative Easing Explained 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pdf/qe-pamphlet.pdf). 
4  The ECB termed its unconventional policy measures as “enhanced credit support.”  See, for 
example, Trichet (2009a, b). 
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 introduced various measures to ensure the stability in financial markets as well as to 
facilitate corporate financing, including fixed-rate full-allotment liquidity provisions 
against eligible corporate debts.  The BOJ has also resumed the purchase of stocks 
held by financial institutions and introduced a scheme to provide subordinated loans to 
financial institutions.5 
The aforementioned policy reactions by major central banks give the impression 
of diverse approaches to support the economy.  As central banks in the major 
economies expand their scope of unconventional policy measures, it is often 
emphasized that the Fed’s policy reactions put more emphasis on the asset side of the 
central bank balance sheet, termed credit easing.6    Such policy responses often contrast 
with the BOJ’s QEP from 2001 to 2006, setting a target for the current account balances, 
the liability side of its balance sheet.   
The distinct difference arises not because central banks have different objectives, 
but because they face different environments and restrictions, such as the types and 
origins of the shocks hitting the economy, the structure of the financial system, and 
institutional arrangements of the central bank.  When viewing from a broad 
perspective, the responses of various central banks demonstrate more similarities than 
differences. 
Looking back at the BOJ’s policy responses after the burst of the bubble, 
especially since the late 1990s, we can find the striking similarities to the policy 
                                                 
5  For more detailed information of the BOJ’s policy measures in the current financial crisis, see the 
special web page of the BOJ’s web site (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/seisaku_cfc/index.htm).  In 
implementing various unconventional measures, the BOJ has emphasized the importance of acting as a 
safety valve for the financial system, given that the financial condition of Japanese financial institutions 
has been relatively stable even after the emergence of the U.S. subprime mortgage problem.    Regarding 
the stability of Japan’s financial system, BOJ (2009) concluded that “Japan’s financial system has 
generally been stable, although the effects from the global financial crisis that began in 2008 still remain.” 
6  Bernanke (2009a) first termed the Fed’s approach to supporting credit markets as credit easing, and 
pointed out the conceptual distinction from the QEP, carried out by the BOJ from 2001 to 2006.    Yellen 
(2009) also pointed out that “the differences outweigh the similarities” by comparing the current Fed’s 
practice and the BOJ’s experience, pointing the Fed’s focus on the asset side of its balance sheet to 
improve credit flows in specific markets.  In that context, Bean (2009) mentioned that the BOE’s 
quantitative easing was differentiated from the BOJ’s QEP by designing its asset purchase program to 
target the assets held primarily by the non-bank private sector. 
2 
 measures currently taken by central banks in the major economies.7  T h e  B O J  
provided ample excess reserves by using various tools for money market operations, 
including an increase in the outright purchase of long-term government bonds.  The 
BOJ also adopted credit easing measures in the current terminology.  The assets 
purchased included asset-backed securities (ABSs) and asset-backed commercial papers 
(ABCPs).  The BOJ also took unprecedented measures to secure the stability of the 
financial system, including the purchases of stocks held by financial institutions. 
                                                
In theory, such unconventional monetary policy can be implemented by 
combining the two elements of the central bank balance sheet, size and composition.  
The size corresponds to expanding the balance sheet, while keeping its composition 
unchanged (narrowly-defined quantitative easing).  The composition corresponds to 
changing the composition of the balance sheet, while keeping its size unchanged by 
replacing conventional assets with unconventional assets (narrowly-defined credit 
easing).   
In a financial and economic crisis, both the asset and liability sides of the central 
bank balance sheet play an important role in countering the adverse effects stemming 
from the financial system.  The asset side works as a substitute for private financial 
intermediation, for example, through the outright purchase of credit products.  The 
liability side, especially expanded excess reserves, functions as a buffer for funding 
liquidity risk in the money markets.  In addition, the two sides interact closely, since 
malfunctions in financial intermediation are closely tied to funding liquidity risk at 
financial institutions, resulting in the increased demand for excess reserves. 
In practice, given constraints on policy implementation, central banks have 
combined the two elements of their balance sheet, size and composition, to enhance the 
overall effects of unconventional policy.  In that respect, quantitative easing, often 
used in a vague manner, better fits as a package of unconventional policy measures 
making use of both the asset and liability sides of the central bank balance sheet, 
designed to absorb the shocks hitting the economy (broadly-defined quantitative easing).   
 
7  Shirakawa (2009a, c) also points out the striking similarities between the policy measures taken by 
the BOJ since the late 1990s and those currently taken by central banks in the major economies.  We 
also find some differences at the same time, especially in the employment of a policy commitment.    The 
BOJ made a commitment to the QEP “until core CPI inflation becomes stably zero or above.”  In the 
current crisis, however, quite a few central banks, such as the Bank of Canada and Sveriges Riksbank, 
have employed policy commitment. 
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 The BOJ’s QEP from 2001 to 2006 can be viewed as broadly-defined quantitative 
easing, as the policy responses of central banks to the current financial and economic 
crisis. 
Such a way of understanding about unconventional policy measures suggests a 
close connection with a policy commitment regarding the duration for maintaining 
short-term interest rates at virtually zero, since financial and economic circumstances 
that require unconventional policy measures are most likely to accompany an extremely 
low level of policy interest rates for a considerable period into the future.    In that sense, 
it is inappropriate to consider that unconventional policy measures and policy 
commitment under zero interest rates are completely separated policy measures. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II summarizes Japan’s experience 
of the quantitative easing policy from 2001 to 2006.  Section III examines the role of 
the central bank balance sheet under unconventional monetary policy, by focusing on 




II.  BOJ’s Quantitative Easing Policy from 2001 to 2006 
This section reviews Japan’s experience of the QEP and summarizes its effects mainly 
on financial markets (See Table 2 for the major policy events under the QEP). 
 
A.  Basic Framework of BOJ’s Quantitative Easing Policy 
On March 19, 2001, The BOJ adopted a new monetary easing framework of the QEP in 
response to an economic downturn triggered by the burst of the global IT bubble.    The 
QEP consisted of three pillars: 
 
(1)  The BOJ changed its main operating target for money market operations from 
the uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current 
account balances (CABs) held by financial institutions at the BOJ. 
(2)  The BOJ committed itself to maintaining the above procedure until the core 
CPI (headline excluding perishables) inflation became stably zero or above.8 
                                                 
8  The BOJ clarified its commitment to maintaining the QEP in October 2003.  First, it requires not 
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 (3)  The BOJ would increase the amount at the outright purchase of long-term 
Japanese government bonds (JGBs), up to a ceiling of the outstanding balance 
of banknotes issued, if judged necessary to ensure the smooth provision of 
liquidity. 
 
The QEP started with a CAB target at 5 trillion yen, a level slightly above the 
required reserve level of 4 trillion yen (Figure 2).  The target was then progressively 
increased in response to the decline in economic activity.    The target was finally raised 
to 30-35 trillion yen in January 2004, and remained unchanged at that level until the 
QEP was terminated in March 2006.     
Reflecting the ample liquidity provision under the QEP, the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate fell to 0.001 percent, a level below the 0.02–0.03 percent in place 
from 1999 to 2000 under the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP).    To meet the CAB target 
smoothly, the BOJ gradually increased the outright purchase of long-term JGBs from 
the initial pace of 400 billion yen per month, setting the amount at 1,200 billion yen per 
month beginning in October 2002.  From July 2003 to March 2006, as a temporary 
measure, the BOJ purchased ABSs with a view toward supporting the development of 
the ABS market and strengthening the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
The core CPI inflation turned positive in November 2005, and the rate for 
January 2006, announced in early March, was 0.5 percent (Figure 3).9  On March 9, 
2006, the BOJ deemed the conditions for the commitment under the QEP met and 
decided to terminate the QEP and to return the operating target of money market 
operations to the uncollateralized overnight call rate, while maintaining the rate at 
effectively zero percent. 
When terminating the QEP, the BOJ announced that the CABs would be 
reduced over a period of a several months, fully taking into account conditions in the 
short-term money market.  The reductions in the CABs proceeded smoothly as 
                                                                                                                                               
only that the most recently published core CPI should register a zero or above, but also that such tendency 
should be confirmed over a few months.  Second, the Bank needs to be convinced that the prospective 
core CPI will not be expected to fall below zero.     
9  The year on year changes in the CPI revised downward by 0.43 percentage points at the time of 
2005 base revision, which was a far larger downward revision, compared with the previous 2000 base 
year revision of 0.25 percentage points. 
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 scheduled in a few months before the first policy rate increase in July 2006.10  T h e  
BOJ’s communication efforts to convey its policy intention played a key role in several 
respects.  First, the conditions for the commitment to the QEP enhanced the 
predictability of the timing of the termination of the QEP.  Second, in the face of 
market expectations regarding the termination of the QEP, the BOJ repeatedly 
explained that the termination itself would entail no sudden policy changes and that the 
policy rates would be adjusted only gradually.  Third, the BOJ encouraged financial 
institutions to prepare for a decline in excess reserves by re-establishing the 
management system for funding liquidity risk.11 
 
B.  Effects of the BOJ’s Quantitative Easing Policy 
This subsection summarizes the effects of the QEP by focusing on financial markets, 
since empirical evidence suggests that the expansion of the monetary base had limited 
effects on aggregate variables, such as output and inflation.  Ugai (2007) concludes in 
his comprehensive survey on empirical studies on the effects of the QEP, that effect of 
expanding the monetary base and altering the composition of the BOJ’s balance sheet, if 
any, is generally smaller than that stemming from the policy commitment.12 
Given the fragile state of the financial markets, the ample provision of reserves 
under the QEP, coupled with the policy commitment of maintaining zero interest rates 
for a considerable period into the future, resulted in the strong liquidity effect.  Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2004a) empirically examined the effects of policy commitment on the 
market expectations, implied in the changes in the shape of yield curves, the so-called 
                                                 
10  As a basis for the smooth exit from the QEP, restoration of the stability in Japan’s financial system 
is crucial.    In fact, the blanket protection on bank deposits was lifted without confusion in April 2005.     
11  In this connection, the maturity of the short-term fund-supplying operation shortened in advance to 
the termination of the QEP, from the second half of 2005.   That was because the BOJ tried to minimize 
the intervention to the money markets, thereby promoting restoration of their functioning, including 
smoother formation of interest rates on term transactions. 
12   In that context, Ito and Mishkin (2006), for example, argued that the BOJ’s policy responses were 
not aggressive enough to fight deflation, and, in addition, that lack of the BOJ’s confidence on the 
effectiveness of unconventional policy measures did undermine their effects.  By contrast, Ueda (2005) 
recollected that major misconceptions about the BOJ’s policy measures arose in the outside of the BOJ, 
including academic economists, leading to bold arguments for using extreme measures to overcome 
deflationary economic conditions, without recognizing the similarity of the BOJ’s policy measures under 
the ZIRP and the QEP with policy measures advocated by academic economists. 
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 policy duration effect.  They showed that the policy duration effect was highly 
effective in stabilizing market expectations regarding the future path of short-term 
interest rates, thereby bringing longer-term interest rates down to flatten the yield 
curve. 13  They also concluded that the policy duration effect failed to reverse 
deflationary expectations in financial markets, since monetary policy alone could not 
reverse deflation, coupled with low economic growth. 
The term spread, defined as the difference between the term contracts of 
Japanese yen Tokyo interbank offered rates (TIBOR) and the overnight call rate, 
declined significantly (Figure 4).  In that context, the maturity of short-term funds-
supplying operation does matter as an element in changes in the composition of the 
central bank balance sheet.    During the QEP, the maturity of money market operations 
lengthened for the smooth provision of ample liquidity, running for ten months in bill-
purchase operations at the final stage of the QEP (Figure 5).  In that sense, the BOJ’s 
QEP was carried out by implementing short-term funds-supplying operations in a 
flexible manner in terms of both instrument and maturity, thereby producing the 
significant effect of mitigating liquidity risk. 
Note that the liquidity effect is likely to differ, depending on the conditions of 
the financial system.14  In fact, we can see a more significant decline in the term 
spread after the introduction of the zero interest rate policy in February 1999.  Before 
then, Japanese financial institutions as a whole confronted severe credit constraints, and 
a significant liquidity event occurred virtually every business day.15 
                                                 
13  Oda and Ueda (2007) carried out a counterfactual simulation, based on their estimated macro-
finance model, and showed that the policy commitment under the ZIRP and the QEP stabilized market 
expectations regarding the future course of short-term interest rates at a low level, thus pushing down the 
yield curve.   
14  Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002) empirically examined the liquidity effects of the ZIRP in Japan from 
1999 to 2000.  They showed that the zero interest rate policy, even with a restricted expansion of the 
reserves, produced a very significant liquidity effect under a very fragile condition of the Japanese money 
market.  
15  In the late 1990s, Japanese financial institutions faced more serious liquidity constraints in dollar 
funding, as shown in, for example, Saito and Shiratsuka (2001).  In this context, currency swap 
agreements between central banks contributed significantly to mitigating liquidity constraints in dollar 
funding under the current financial crisis.     
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 Additionally, the QEP influenced credit spreads significantly (Figure 6).16  The 
credit spread for financial institutions, measured as the difference between the CD rate 
and the TB rate in three-month contracts, appears to have declined sharply soon after 
the introduction of the QEP.  The credit spreads for non-financial businesses, 
measured as the differences between the credit products indicators across ratings and 
the TB rate in three-month contracts, also declined, but with certain time-lags after the 
introduction of the QEP, indicating a significant reduction in the external financing 
premium for the non-financial business sector.    It should be noted that such significant 
reductions in the external financing premium was realized by lesser amounts of direct 
intervention in credit products markets (Figure 7). 
As examined so far, the QEP played a certain role in bolstering Japan’s economy, 
in particular by stabilizing the financial system.  Such stimulative effects failed to be 
transmitted to the outside of the financial system, suggesting that the transmission 
channel between the financial and non-financial sectors had been blocked.17  T h e   Q E P  
did not thus produce the effect of reversing the financial market’s expectations that 
deflation would persist, as discussed in Okina and Shiratsuka (2004a).   
At the same time, the QEP produced certain side-effects particularly coming 
from pushing short-term interest rates down to virtually zero, evidenced as a 
deterioration in the functioning of the money markets.18  That is clearly visible in the 
sharp decline in the outstanding amounts of the uncollateralized call market: from 
around 20 trillion yen in early 2001 to 3.4 trillion yen in December 2002 (Figure 8).  
Such declined outstanding amounts of the uncollateralized call market did not recover 
in 2004-05 even after Japan’s financial system restored its stability as a whole, with 
resolving the nonperforming loan problem.   
                                                 
16  See, for example, Baba et al. (2006) for empirical evidence of reduction in credit spreads for 
Japanese financial institutions in money markets. 
17  Okina and Shiratsuka (2004b) pointed out that the BOJ had to conduct monetary policy under a 
significant and unforeseen slowdown in the potential growth, which differed significantly from a standard 
stabilization policy around a stable growth trend.  Under such circumstances, it should be stressed that 
the elimination of the structural impediments themselves is a more effective policy response than 
measures taken for a sustained period to offset cyclical factors. 
18  There seems to be a general consensus among the central banks that money market rates are need to 
keep at a positive level to minimize the side effects arising from a zero-interest-rate environment. 
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 Under the QEP, market participants lost the incentive to engage in transactions 
in the call market.  Lenders barely covered transaction costs, given very tight interest 
margins, since the overnight call rate remained very close to zero.  Borrowers did not 
need to raise funds in the money market primarily because the funds-supplying 
operations of the BOJ offered the primary means of financing.  That implies that the 
money markets under zero interest rates with ample liquidity almost stopped 
functioning as a risk-sharing device among financial institutions.  Financial  institutions 
chose the face-to-face transactions with the BOJ, in preference to market transactions 
with other participants.     
 
 
III.  Unconventional Monetary Policy 
This section examines the role of the central bank balance sheets under unconventional 
monetary policy, focusing on the link between the two sides of the balance sheet. 
 
A. Typology  of  Unconventional Monetary Policies 
The policy responses of central banks to the current financial and economic crisis can 
be divided into three main areas: reducing the policy interest rate; securing the stability 
of financial markets; and facilitating corporate financing.    In the second and third areas, 
central banks in the major economies have introduced various unconventional measures 
in the range of financial assets being purchased and in the scale of such purchases.  
Central banks have implemented such unconventional measures by aggressively 
changing the size and composition of their balance sheets.     
As central banks in the major economies expand the scope of unconventional 
policy measures, it is often emphasized that the Fed’s policy reactions put more 
emphasis on the asset side of the central bank balance sheet, an approach referred to as 
credit easing.  For example, Bernanke (2009a) first called the Fed’s approach to 
supporting credit market as credit easing, and points out the conceptual distinction from 
the QEP undertaken by the BOJ from 2001 to 2006.  He argued that the stimulative 
effects of credit easing depend crucially on the particular mix of lending programs and 
securities purchases tailored to the dysfunctional credit markets in the United States.19 
                                                 
19  Bernanke (2009a) also mentioned that the differences in approach between the Fed and the BOJ do 
9 
 In theory, such unconventional policy can be decomposed into two elements 
(Figure 9):  The first element focuses on the size of the central bank balance sheet, 
while the second element focuses on the composition of the central bank balance sheet.   
In the hypothetical case, the first element can be implemented by increasing the balance 
sheet size while keeping its composition unchanged by restraining money market 
operations with standard tools (narrowly-defined quantitative easing).  The second 
element can be implemented by changing the composition of the balance sheet while 
keeping its size unchanged by replacing conventional assets with unconventional assets 
(narrowly-defined credit easing). 
Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) used the above classification of unconventional 
monetary policy and provide an overview of monetary policy strategies when short-term 
interest rates are very low or even zero.20  They examined the effects of changing the 
composition and size of the central bank balance sheet, in addition to altering market 
expectations about the future course of short-term interest rates.  They focused 
primarily on the portfolio rebalancing effect stemming from the changes in the 
composition and size of the central bank balance sheet.    By shifting the composition of 
asset holdings from shorter- to longer-dated government securities, a central bank may 
influence term premiums and an overall yield curve, if investors treat them as imperfect 
substitutes.  Similarly, by increasing the monetary base, a central bank may also 
influence prices and yields of non-money assets, if the monetary base is an imperfect 
substitute for other financial assets.     
In the policy responses to the current financial and economic crisis, however, 
both the asset and liability sides of the central bank balance sheet play roles different 
from the above portfolio rebalancing effects.21  On the one hand, the asset side works 
as a substitute for private financial intermediation, for example, through outright 
purchases of credit products.    On the other hand, the liability side, especially expanded 
excess reserves, functions as a buffer for liquidity risk in the financial markets.  In 
                                                                                                                                               
not reflect “any doctrinal disagreement,” but “rather the differences in financial and economic conditions 
between the two episodes.” 
20  Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) provided a comprehensive review on empirical evidence of 
monetary policy alternatives at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. 
21  One of the important factors in formulating an exit strategy from unconventional policy measures is 
whether an expansion of the central bank balance sheet is driven by its asset side or liability side.    I will 
come back to this point in the next subsection. 
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 addition, the two sides interact closely with each other, since malfunctions in financial 
intermediation are closely tied to funding liquidity risk at financial institutions, resulting 
in the increased demand for excess reserves. 
In practice, central banks have attempted to combine the two elements of their 
balance sheet, size and composition, to enhance the overall effects of unconventional 
monetary policy based on their specific environments and restrictions, such as types and 
origins of the shocks hitting the economy, the structure of the financial system, and 
institutional arrangements of the central bank.  In that regard, quantitative easing fits 
better as a package of unconventional policy measures to absorb the shocks hitting the 
economy, given the constraints on their policy implementation (broadly-defined 
quantitative easing).  The BOJ’s QEP from 2001 to 2006 can be viewed as broadly-
defined quantitative easing, as the policy responses of central banks to the current 
financial and economic crisis. 
 
B.  Determinants of Size and Composition 
As described by the typology of unconventional monetary policies, central banks 
implement unconventional monetary policy by changing both the size and composition 
of their balance sheets.  In this case, the size and composition of the balance sheet 
depends on the state of the economy, particularly the financial system. 
For example, when the increases in balance sheet size come from increased 
demand for excess reserves due to serious concern over liquidity risk, not the 
malfunctions in financial intermediation, but the increases in conventional money 
market operations may accommodate an expansion of the balance sheet.  In this case, 
such conventional operations are implemented by extending their maturity, as the case 
seen in the BOJ’s QEP (see Figure 5).    That can be seen as kind of credit easing in the 
maturity variety, not in the product variety.  Conversely, when not excess reserve 
demand, but the malfunctions in financial intermediation induce an expansion of the 
central bank balance sheet, increased purchases of unconventional financial assets 
should be accommodated by increases in some sort of central bank liability. 
Figure 10 shows the balance sheets for the BOJ and the Fed.  The figure shows that 
the increases on the liability side are mostly attributable to the increases in reserves, 
while currency in circulation, a major liability in normal times, remains relatively stable.   
11 
 By contrast, the sources of increases on the asset side significantly differ between the 
BOJ and the Fed.  The BOJ increases both JGB holdings and other conventional 
assets.22    The Fed increases not only short-term lending, but also central bank liquidity 
swaps, credit facilities, and agency mortgage backed securities.  In short, the BOJ and 
the Fed accommodate increased demand for reserves to mitigate liquidity risk by 
purchasing different types of assets. 
The differences in assets purchased are closely related to the differences in the 
financial structure of the economy.23  Figure 11 illustrates the structures of financial 
intermediation in Japan and the United States.    The figure clearly shows that Japan has 
a largely bank-centered financial system, while the United States has a primarily 
market-based financial system.     
The U.S. financial system, particularly the credit products markets closely linked 
to the subprime mortgages, has fallen into serious dislocation.    In response, the Fed has 
naturally taken credit-easing measures to intervene aggressively in the credit products 
markets and related markets, seeking temporarily to serve in place of the malfunctioning 
private financial intermediation using its own balance sheet.  In addition, such 
malfunctions in the credit products markets are closely tied to funding liquidity risk at 
financial institutions, resulting in the accumulation of excess reserves, which appears on 
the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet. 
 
C.  Balance Sheet Expansion and Zero Interest Rates 
As mentioned above, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) consider two types of the policy 
options under zero lower bound constraints of nominal interest rates: changing the 
composition and size of the central bank balance sheet as well as altering market 
expectations about the future course of short-term interest rates.  In the current crisis, 
however, only a limited number of central banks have employed an explicit policy 
                                                 
22  In addition, the BOJ introduced the purchases of stocks held by financial institutions, since market 
risk associated with stock-holdings was the major risk component for Japanese banks, especially major 
banks.  For the details on the costs-benefits analysis of equity holdings of Japanese banks, see Chapter 
IV of BOJ (2007). 
23  Trichet (2009) pointed out that the ECB’s policy actions are at all times carefully calibrated to the 
structure of the euro economy and its financial structure in particular. 
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 commitment. 24   I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  w h a t  d o  w e  t h ink of the relationship between 
unconventional monetary policy and policy commitment under zero nominal interest 
rates?  
Focusing on the expectation channel, a central bank can produce further easing 
effects by a policy commitment, even when short-term interest rates decline to virtually 
zero.25  A central bank can influence market expectations by making an explicit 
commitment to the duration for which it will hold short-term interest rates at virtually 
zero.  If it succeeds in credibly extending its commitment duration, it can reduce 
longer-term interest rates.26 
As mentioned earlier, however, many central banks have employed 
unconventional policy measures without making a clear commitment to the future path 
of monetary policy in the current crisis.  Unconventional policy measures are 
implemented through expanding the central bank balance sheet, and, during that process, 
policy interest rates are also reduced.  It should be noted that policy interest rates are 
maintained marginally above zero, while policy interest rates are reduced to virtually 
zero during the ZIRP and the QEP.  In the mean time, many central banks have 
adopted an interest payment scheme for excess reserves, thus coming to an 
understanding that it is unnecessary to guide the policy interest rates around virtually 
zero in maintaining a certain amount of excess reserves.27 
                                                 
24   Some central banks have employed some kinds of policy commitment to make clear their policy 
intention to stabilize longer-term interest rates.  For example, the Bank of Canada has recently 
committed itself to maintaining its target overnight rate at 25 basis points for a full year, based on their 
inflation projections.   In a weaker form of policy commitment, the Fed has been using kind of forward-
looking language: “[The committee] continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant 
an exceptionally low level of the federal funds rates for an extended period.” 
25    See Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), and Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) for detailed discussions on the policy commitment effect when a central bank faces the 
zero boundary of nominal interest rates. 
26    We call this mechanism the “policy-duration effect,” after Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2001) and 
Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002). 
27  Once private financial intermediation restores normal functions, interest payments on reserves close 
to policy interest rates entail a risk of distorting resource allocation through the financial system.    Thus, 
spreads between policy interest rates and interest rates for reserves are likely to expand gradually, thus 
promoting a reduction in excess reserves.  That point is important, especially in relation to the exit 
strategy I will touch on later. 
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 In general, a central bank expands its balance sheet to deal with the worsening of 
the financial intermediation function and the increase in funding liquidity risk, 
associated with downward pressure on economic activity.  Under such circumstances, 
monetary policy is principally directed towards reducing the policy interest rates, 
thereby easing monetary conditions.  In particular, it is supposed that a central bank 
attempts to maintain the policy interest rate at an extremely low level when it expands 
its balance sheet on a large scale to deal with the tremendous adverse shocks stemming 
from the financial system.    Therefore, since financial and economic circumstances that 
require unconventional policy measures are most likely to accompany an extremely low 
level of policy interest rates.  In that sense, it is inappropriate to consider that 
unconventional policy measures and policy commitment under zero interest rates are 
completely separated policy measures. 
Note that central banks’ policy responses in the current crisis are not a natural 
extension of pure monetary policy under zero interest rates, but an emergency operation 
to rescue the financial system.  In the current crisis, given the expansion of market-
based financial intermediation, many central banks have extended the scope of such 
rescue operations beyond the traditional role as lender of last resort, such as provision of 
funding liquidity to non-bank financial institutions and restoration of market liquidity in 




Given the understanding of unconventional monetary policy discussed so far, this 
section addresses some questions at stake regarding the implementation of 
unconventional monetary policy. 
 
A.  Nature of Balance Sheet Expansion 
Several policy implications arise from the above arguments on the determinants of size 
                                                 
28  Kuttner (2008), for example, viewed the recent Fed’s policy responses as lender of last resort, and 
their effects and costs in detail.    In addition, Tucker (2009) discussed three types of last resort operations 
in a financial crisis: lender of last resort, market maker of last resort, and capital of last resort.  He 
pointed out that the first two operations are carried out by a central bank, while the last one needs to be 
done by a government. 
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 and composition of the central bank balance sheet. 
First, quantitative easing is a package of unconventional policy measures 
making use of the both the asset and liability sides of the central bank balance sheet 
designed to absorb the shocks hitting the economy.  A central bank attempts to 
combine the size expansion and the composition change to enhance the overall effects 
of unconventional monetary policy.    That is a common characteristic to the BOJ’s QEP 
from 2001 to 2006 and the policy responses of central banks to the current financial and 
economic crisis. 
Second, quantitative easing is a temporary policy response.29  The increase in 
size and the change in composition of the central bank balance sheet simply buy time 
until certain progress will be made in balance sheet adjustments at financial institutions, 
such as disposal of non-performing assets and recapitalization.  The increase in size 
and the change in composition of the central bank balance sheet do not directly lead to 
the early restoration of the financial  intermediation  function.   
Third, quantitative easing is likely to produce side-effects, as a consequence of 
the strong policy measures implemented to stabilize the financial system.  A massive 
expansion of the central bank balance sheet is the corollary of public intervention in 
private financial transactions, potentially distorting incentives and resource allocation in 
the private sector.  In particular, such side-effects become more obvious as the 
duration of quantitative easing prolongs.  In that sense, a cost-benefit comparison of 
unconventional monetary policy depends crucially on the length of time for which such 
massive intervention is needed.   
 
B.  Permanent Portion as a Price Level Determinant 
While balance sheet expansion is a temporary policy response, the permanent portion of 
the expansion does matter with regard to the effects on general prices in the longer 
term.30  To avoid the adverse effects on general prices, any expansion of the balance 
                                                 
29  From a long-term perspective, it is important to explore a comprehensive policy framework for a 
central bank that encompasses policy management in normal times and crisis management.  Such a 
framework needs to integrate monetary policy and prudential policy to achieve macroeconomic stability, 
comprised of price stability and financial system stability, as a basis for sound development of the 
economy.    For the further discussions on that point, see Shirakawa (2009b, d, e). 
30  In that context, Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) discuss the effects of the central bank balance sheet 
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 sheet must be confined to sustainable levels in the medium to long term, even though an 
extraordinary expansion is allowed temporarily to absorb the shocks hitting the 
economy.31    In that context, it is crucial to stave off public concern that expanding the 
central bank balance sheet will result in money-financing of government deficit, thereby 
preventing instability in the government bond market. 
In that regard, outright purchases of long-term government bonds play an 
important role.  The BOJ has prudently implemented outright purchases of JGBs, as a 
long-term stable asset for the central bank, based on the need for money market 
operations to smoothly provide long-term stable funds according to the banknote 
demand.  When introducing the QEP, the BOJ established a ceiling for outright 
purchases of long-term JGBs within the outstanding amount of bank note issuance (the 
so-called “banknote rule”).  That rule makes it clear that the BOJ has no intention of 
providing price support for JGBs or money-financing of government deficit, thereby 
securing the credibility of the monetary policy. 
 
C.  Balance Sheet Reduction in an Exit Strategy 
In formulating an exit strategy, a central bank needs to consider how to reduce its 
balance sheet as the financial system restores its stability over time.     
Once private financial intermediation restores its normal function, a prolonged 
high level of central bank intervention to the financial system entails a risk of distorting 
resource allocation through the financial system.  Thus, central bank intervention to 
the financial system is no longer necessary, and a central bank is unlikely to face any 
serious obstacle in reducing its balance sheet.32    By contrast, a central bank is unlikely 
                                                                                                                                               
expansion through the fiscal channel.  When the private sector recognizes that the monetary base will 
permanently increase by massive purchases of long-term government bonds by a central bank, the private 
sector comes to expect government debt interest payments to decline over time, consequently reducing 
the private sector’s tax burden.  In that case, massive inflation is required to achieve high nominal 
growth after the economy returns to normal with positive interest rates, while maintaining a permanent 
increase in the monetary base. 
31  In that context, it seems a bit surprising that no economist argues that expansion of the central bank 
balance sheet is crucial in combating deflation in the current situation.  Many economists used to 
advocate that the BOJ should expand its balance sheet as much as possible to combat deflation under zero 
nominal interest rates, because both deflation and inflation are monetary phenomena. 
32  Nishimura (2009) argued that unconventional policy measures needed to possess a self-fading 
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 to exit from unconventional policy in a smooth manner with malfunctions in financial 
intermediation.  Early  economic  recovery  is  hardly possible under such circumstances, 
given the interaction between the real and financial sectors of the economy. 
Suppose that a central bank needs to reduce its balance sheet, since, for example, 
demand for excess reserves subsides, reflecting the recovery of the financial system 
functions, while a large amount of unconventional assets remains on the asset side of 
the central bank balance sheet.  In particular, such a situation is likely to become 
prolonged, if the maturity of unconventional assets is long.  In that process, a central 
bank is nevertheless able to control the size of its balance sheet by employing debt 
instruments to absorb excess liquidity from financial markets, including reverse repos, 
in addition to interest payments to excess reserves.33 
Conversely, suppose that a central bank needs to raise short-term interest rates, 
while very high demand for excess reserves still exists at financial institutions.  That 
implies that reserves and money markets transactions are still imperfect substitutes for 
each other.  Money markets have yet to restore their normal function as a risk-sharing 
device among financial institutions.  In that case, transactions in money markets 
remain highly restricted, and money market rates easily become volatile.  Given such 
fragile conditions in money markets, a central bank is likely to face difficulty in guiding 
money market rates smoothly in a consistent manner to the targeted level of policy 
interest rates.    In addition, a central bank may need to raise short-term interest rates on 
a larger scale, since the transmission mechanism linking financial and non-financial 
sectors remain blocked.   
The above case is most likely to occur when a central bank is forced to raise 
short-term interest rates in view of the economy’s risk of falling into stagflation.  It is 
certainly critical for a central bank to maintain the credibility of monetary policy under 
                                                                                                                                               
characteristic, by designing those measures to unwind themselves as market function improve.  Trichet 
(2009c) also emphasized that the ECB’s unconventional policy measures were designed with exit 
consideration in mind, and that a number of measures would phase out naturally. 
33  Bernanke (2009c) argued that the Fed would be able to reduce its balance sheet in a smooth manner 
with interest payments to reserves, combined with the steps to reduce excess reserves, such as large-scale 
repurchasing agreements, term deposits to financial institutions, and the outright sale of its holdings of 
long-term securities.  See also Dudley (2009) for further discussions on the Fed’s money market 
operation to reduce its balance sheet.   
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 such a difficult situation.34    In fact, some argue that a central bank will be able to exit 
from very low interest rate conditions without reducing its balance sheet size, since a 
central bank has effective tools for controlling short-term interest rates, including 
payment of interest on reserves.  In that case, a central bank needs to control short-
term interest rates by making use of interest payments on reserves, while maintaining a 
certain size of its balance sheet.  It should be noted, however, that a considerable 
degree of uncertainty remains regarding the transmission mechanism from short-term 
interest rates to medium- to long-term interest rates, asset prices, and general prices and 
economic activity.   
 
 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper has attempted to provide a roadmap for a better and more comprehensive 
understanding of unconventional monetary policy by re-examining Japan’s experience 
of the QEP in light of the policy responses to the current financial and economic crisis 
in major economies.    It is crucial to understand that unconventional monetary policy in 
reality combines the two sides of the central bank balance sheet, size and composition, 
to enhance the overall effects of unconventional policy to absorb the shocks hitting the 
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 Table 1. Policy Measures Taken by Major Central Banks 
 
  Bank of Japan  Federal Reserve  European Central 
Bank  Bank of England 
Rate cuts  0.50% to 0.10%  2.00% to   




provision of funds 
over calendar and 
fiscal year-ends; 
- Increase in 
outright purchase 
of JGBs; 
- Interest on excess 
reserve balances 
- Expansion of 
TAF, PDCF, and 
TSLF; 





- Increase in 
counterparties 
- Expansion of 
long-term funds 
provision 
- Discount Window 
Facility 
- BoE Sterling bills 
to drain reserves 
- Operational 
Standing Facility 
- Interest on excess 
reserve balances 
  - U.S. dollar repo  - Increase in swap 
lines with foreign 
central banks 
- U.S. dollar repo 
and Swiss franc 
repo 
- U.S. dollar repo 
Others -  Increase  in 
frequency and size 












- Expansion of 
eligible collateral; 




- Expansion of 
eligible collateral 
  - Outright purchase 
of CP/ABCP and 
CBs; 
- Stock purchases 
held by financial 
institutions; 
- Subordinated 
loans to banks 
- AMLF, CPFF, and 
MMIFF; 




- Outright purchase 
of covered bonds 
- Outright purchase 





 Table 2. Policy Events 
 
Date  Changes in Policy Guidelines 
September 9, 1998  Reduction of targeted O/N rate (0.5 Æ 0.25 %) 
November 13, 1998  Introduction of new money market operations 
February 12, 1999  Introduction of zero interest rate policy 
April 13, 1999  Governor’s announcement of the commitment to zero interest rate 
until deflationary concerns are dispelled 
October 13, 1999  Expansion of the range of money market operations 
August 11, 2000  Termination of zero interest rate policy 
February 9, 2001  Reduction of ODR (0.5Æ0.375%), introduction of new way of 
liquidity provision 
February 28, 2001  Reduction of targeted O/N rate (0.25Æ0.125%) and ODR 
(0.375Æ0.25%) 
March 19, 2001  Decision to introduce quantitative monetary easing policy 
(June 26, 2001)  (Publication of the “Outline of Basic Policies for Macroeconomic 
Management and Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy”) 
August 14, 2001  Raise of the target CAB (5Æ6 trill. yen) 
(September 11, 2001)  Terror Attacks in US on September 11   
September 18, 2001  Raise of the target CAB (6Æabove 6 trill. yen) 
December 19, 2001  Raise of the target CAB (above 6Æ10-15 trill. yen) 
September 18, 2002  Introduction of stock purchasing plan 
(October 30, 2002)  (Publication of the “Program for Financial Revival”) 
October 30, 2002  Raise of the target CAB (10-15Æ15-20 trill. yen) 
March 5, 2003  The target CAB adjustment (15-20 Æ17-22 trill. yen) effective from 
April 1 due to the establishment of the Japan Post 
(Mar 20, 2003)  (Installation of Governor Fukui) 
April 30, 2003  Raise of the target CAB (17-22Æ22-27 trill. yen) 
May 20, 2003  Raise of the target CAB (22-27Æ27-30 trill. yen) 
October 10, 2003  Increase in the upper limit of the target CAB (27-30Æ27-32 trill. 
yen) 
Clarification of the commitment to maintaining the QEP 
January 20, 2004  Raise of the target CAB (27-32Æ30-35 trill. yen) 
Mar 9, 2006  Termination of QEP 
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2007 2008 2009  
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Factors Affecting Reserve 
Balances”; Bank of England, Monetary & Financial Statistics; European Central Bank, 
Monthly Bulletin; Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly.  
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QEP: Gov. Fukui ZIRP QEP:
Gov. Hayami
 
Note:  Solid line indicates the outstanding amounts of the current account balances at the Bank of 
Japan, and shaded lines indicate the ceiling and floor of the target range of the current account 
balances. 
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly. 
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Note:  Core inflation is an indicator that excludes the impacts of perishable food prices from the 
headline indicator. 
Source:  Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Consumer Price Index. 
 

















1998 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09  
Note:  Term spreads are defined as the differences between TIBORs for 1, 2, and 3-month 
contracts and overnight uncollateralized call rate. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly. 
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Notes:  Figures are weighted average maturities of short-term funds-supplying operations offered 
during each quarter.  The amounts of funds supplied are used as the weight.  Short-term 
funds-supplying operations include: (1) funds-supplying operations against pooled collateral 
(bill-purchasing operations until June 2006), (2) purchase of Japanese Government Securities 
with repurchase agreements, and (3) purchases of CP with repurchase agreements.   
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly.   
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QEP ZIRP
 
Note:  Credit spreads are defined as the differences between credit product below and TB rates in 
three-month contracts.   
Banks: CD new issue rate for 3-month 
Non-financial business: Bloomberg Fair Market Value Index for companies with rating AA, 
A, BBB, and BB 
Sources: Bloomberg; Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly.  
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Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly. 
 


















Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly. 
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Unconventional policy in practice
Credit easing in a pure form (B/S composition)











































































Notes:  The details of asset components are as follows: 
Bank of Japan: Short-term funds-supplying operations include funds-supplying operations against 
pooled collateral, purchase of JGBs and TBs with repurchase agreements, and complementary 
lending facility.    Credit facilities and equities include: purchases of CPs with repurchase agreements, 
outright purchase of CPs, and purchase of equities held by commercial banks.    LLR lending include: 
loans based on Article 38 of the BOJ Law, and those to the DIC. 
Federal Reserve: Short-term lending include: short-term repos, primary credit, secondary credit, 
seasonal credit, and term auction credit.  Credit facilities include: PDCF (primary dealer credit 
facility), TSLF (term securities lending facilities), AMLF (ABCP MMMF liquidity facility), CPFF 
(CP funding facility), MMIFF (money market investor funding facility), and TALF (term asset-
backed loan facilities).  LLR lending include: credit extended to AIG, and net portfolio holdings of 
Maiden Lane I, II, and III.     
Sources:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances”; 
Bank of Japan, Economic and Financial Statistics Monthly.  
31 









80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Other financial institutions
Insurance and pension funds
Depository corporations
(Ratio to nominal GDP, %)
 








80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Other financial institutions
Insurance and pension funds
Depository corporations
(Ratio to nominal GDP, %)
 
Notes:  Other financial institutions in Japan are comprised of securities investment trusts, 
nonbanks, and financial dealers and brokers. Those in the United States are the sum of 
investment trusts, financial dealers and brokers, nonbanks, and funding companies.  
Sources: Cabinet Office, "National Accounts"; Bank of Japan, "Flow of Funds Accounts; "Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, "National Economic Accounts"; FRB, "Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
United States."   
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